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considerations play a large role in the theism-naturalism debate will have
to consist of a sizable number of passages quoted from participants in that
debate. On the other hand, the extended argument, to the effect that theism has more explanatory power than naturalism, could well have been
presented more in their own voice and less in the voice of others.

Divine Evil? The Moral Character of the God of Abraham, edited by Michael
Bergmann, Michael J. Murray, and Michael C. Rea. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 337 pages. $125.00 (hardcover).
PAUL COPAN, Palm Beach Atlantic University
In 2009, the University of Notre Dame hosted the “My Ways Are Not Your
Ways” conference. On the table was the topic of the moral character of
“the God of Abraham” as found in the Hebrew scriptures. The able philosophers and co-editors of this volume—Bergmann, Murray, and Rea—have
put together an important collection of essays on a subject getting increasing attention, due in some measure to the criticisms of the New Atheistic
foursome (Dawkins, Hitchens, Harris, Dennett). In this volume, protagonists and antagonists directly address issues all-too-frequently evaded
by Bible readers—the nature of the God of the Hebrews, who apparently
“commends bigotry, misogyny, and homophobia, condones slavery, and
demands the adoption of unjust laws” (1).
Contributors friendly to the Hebrew God include Eleonore Stump,
Alvin Plantinga, Richard Swinburne, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Peter van
Inwagen, Mark Murphy, and John Hare. Those on the not-too-pleasedwith-God side include Louise Antony, Edwin Curley, Evan Fales, Wes
Morriston, and Paul Draper.
The book is divided into four parts: (I) Philosophical Perspectives:
Problems Presented; (II) Philosophical Perspectives: Solutions Proposed;
(III) Theological Perspectives; (IV) Concluding Remarks. What adds interest and depth to the book is the structure of each chapter (save the last), in
which the presentation is followed by an opponent’s comments, to which
the original presenter replies to round things out.
In the introduction, the editors analyze the various options on moral
difficulties in the Hebrew scriptures with, for instance, the category of
herem (“the ban/devotion to destruction”): (a) deny the texts are divinely
inspired; (b) deny God’s goodness; (c) declare the biblical text a mystery
on these matters; or (d) “(try to) revise one’s own moral values, intuitions,
or whatever in light of the text” (12).
Now, the book is not as wide-ranging as many of us would have wanted
it to be, and this is understandable given space limitations. Indeed, the Godcritics such as Louise Antony, Edwin Curley, and Evan Fales in particular
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raise more snakes than the God-defenders attempt to kill. In my estimation,
more chapters on the Hebrew texts on servitude in Israel, harsh laws, and
treatment of women could have helped round out the discussion. The topic
receiving the most attention from both sides is Israel’s warfare against the
Canaanites (Joshua and Judges)—and the Amalekites (1 Samuel 15) and
even the Midianites (Numbers 31). The contributors not only offer some
fruitful (not to mention critical) moral and theological reflections, but even
hermeneutical and textual ones as well. John Hare’s chapter on “Animal
Sacrifices” is well-written and, to my mind, persuasive, but something of a
deviation from the book’s common core.
I refer the book’s readers to the “Chapter Abstracts” (22–26) for a concise overview of its contents. Below, I shall simply note some of the contributions on both sides of the debate to give the reader a feel for the book.
On the negative side, we see comments like Edwin Curley’s, who challenges the attempt to find good motives for killing Canaanites. Some may
attempt to rephrase “God so loved the Canaanites that he ordered the
Israelites to utterly destroy them” by resorting to the academically polite
jargon of decent obscurity: “It’s epistemically possible that God ordered
the Israelites to destroy the Canaanites out of love for the Canaanites”
(71–71). Curley dismisses these as desperate measures.
Evan Fales’s “Satanic Verses” chapter is a hard-hitting one, which includes a “catalogue of ‘horrors’” approved or permitted by Yahweh. For
good measure, he throws in the New Testament, which goes beyond the
Hebrew Bible’s vagueness about postmortem existence by offering a more
developed understanding—including the doctrine of hell, which Fales
finds morally repugnant.
Louise Antony uses the children’s story of Heckedy Peg to illustrate a disanalogy: on the one hand, we have a loving, valiant mother who rescues
her disobedient children who have fallen into the hands of the trickster
Heckedy Peg, and, on the other, God’s treatment of Adam and Eve after
they’ve succumbed to the paradisal tempter: “Heckedy Peg celebrates the
valor of maternal love; Genesis exhibits the power of a tyrant” (30). Again:
“In attitudes, motives, methods, and reactions, God is the antithesis of a
good parent” (ibid.). Antony throws in criticisms of God’s (mis)treatment
of Job and of Moses to reinforce her point.
On the positive side, Richard Swinburne follows Augustine’s dictum
of interpreting particular passages as metaphorical when they clearly
conflict with purity of life or sound doctrine—such as the Canaanite passages. By contrast, Plantinga, Murphy, and Stump tackle the worst-case
herem scenario—that God was justified even if he commanded the killing
of Canaanites/Amalekites. Plantinga states that God is the Giver (and thus
rightful Taker) of life; that death is not the worst thing; that the Canaanites’ sin was far more wicked than our dulled modern moral intuitions
recognize; and that the Incarnation and Atonement reveal the love of God
and that “whatever God did, he must indeed have a good reason, even if
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we can’t see what the reason is” (113). Murphy argues that God did not
act wrongly with respect to the Jerichoites since God did not wrong them;
God and humans do not participate in the same “dikaiological order.”
Murphy states that, analogously, parents do or demand things that are
not always understood by their children—things that may appear severe
or arbitrary (167).
Peter van Inwagen comments that the Hebrew Bible sought to address
the twistedness of the Jews to help them see more clearly how corrupted
they were—not to create perfect people—and that Judeo-Christian-inspired
morality brought about a dramatic change in the Mediterranean world in
the face of Roman brutality: “The morality of almost everyone in Western
Europe and the Anglophone countries today (if that person is not a criminal
or a sociopath)” is basically a variation on Judeo-Christian morality (81).
Wolterstorff’s chapter (“Reading Joshua”), along with his reply to Gary
Anderson, includes a careful literary analysis of the Hebrew Bible’s war
texts. Acknowledging the harsh language such as “leave alive nothing
that breathes,” the text simultaneously mentions large numbers of surviving Canaanites who cannot even be driven out by Israel. Critics emphasize
the “literal” killing of Canaanites while ignoring their “literal” survival
and ongoing coexistence with Israel. War texts stating “no survivor was
left” should be understood hyperbolically, not literally: “These texts are
highly stylized, metaphorical, hyperbolic” (287).
Stump’s response to Paul Draper on the topic of the Amalekites is particularly insightful. She offers a thought experiment of “an intelligent being
Max from a far-distant world” in which all sentient beings never get seriously sick and none ever dies. Max is enabled to view a video of “events
inside a large city hospital on earth where the Chief of Staff is a surgeon.”
Upon seeing the video, “Max is filled with moral indignation at the doctors,
who plunge sharp objects into human beings first to render them helpless
and then to slice them open with sharp knives” (204). The patients appear
to leave the hospital in far worse shape than when they came in. Stump
concludes: “Genocide, like torture, is not properly defined without reference to some intention or motivation. Where the primary aim is healing,
rescue from death, there is neither torture nor genocide. And just as it is
possible to recognize what looks like torture as instead done in the interest
of healing, however counter-intuitive such a recognition may seem to Max,
it is also possible to recognize God’s ending of the existence of civilizations,
nations, and peoples as motivated by providential care” (207).
The book is as engaging as a scholarly book can get—from the chapters’
formatting to the range of participants in this debate. The book’s editors
are to be commended for specifically encouraging interdisciplinary engagement beyond this book. They mention four areas for further research:
ancient Near Eastern literary styles; ancient Near Eastern cultures; the relevance of interpretive traditions; and theories about biblical inspiration,
divine revelation, and the authority of scripture and tradition (13–19).
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We can be grateful for such a book that tackles these difficult issues
head-on and for its encouragement to probe these matters more thoroughly in the context of interdisciplinary dialogue.

Consciousness and the Existence of God: A Theistic Argument, by J. P. Moreland.
New York, 2008. 244 pages. $133 (hardcover).
Ulrich Schmidt, Academy for Philosophy, Munich
In his book Consciousness and the Existence of God: A Theistic Argument, J. P.
Moreland argues that the existence of conscious beings in the universe
is evidence for the existence of God. In the first chapter, Moreland addresses naturalism, the main rival world-view opposed to theism. Strong
naturalism is the view that all particulars, all properties, all relations, and
all laws in the universe are physical. And there are no entities like mental
properties, souls, angels or God inside or outside of the universe. The
spatio-temporal universe (or universes) postulated by current science is
all there is (8–9). By contrast, weak naturalism softens the definition of
strong naturalism and accepts forms of emergent mental properties (ix,
8–9). Naturalism is committed to telling a “Grand Story,” a causal story
of how all things there are now in the universe came to be. This story
will include the Big Bang, the development of organic matter out of inorganic structures, the evolution of complex organisms and the emergence
of consciousness (6–8). The ontology of a naturalist will be a physicalist
ontology, and existence will be defined as belonging to the causal spacetime system of our universe (8–10). If we accept naturalism, then we must
either reduce consciousness to physical states (reductive physicalism)
or deny that consciousness exists (eliminative physicalism). Naturalism
faces the location problem: Naturalists allow only physical entities to
exist. So they have the problem of what to do with entities like semantic
content, mind, consciousness, qualia, and agency. Where should they be
located? The naturalist faces the tough task of locating them somewhere
in the mereological hierarchy which naturalists usually accept.
In naturalism, the ground level of the hierarchy consists of elementary
particles. At higher levels there are sub-atomic parts, atoms, molecules,
cells and living organisms. These entities are constituted by the elementary
particles. Their properties and their behavior can be entirely explained in
terms of the properties and behavior of the elementary particles. They
can be reduced to the elementary particles. The relation between individuals at level n and individuals at level n + 1 is the part-whole-relation.
Cells are parts of living organisms. Molecules are parts of cells. Atoms
are parts of molecules. Sub-atomic parts like protons and neutrons are
parts of atoms. Elementary particles like up-quarks and down-quarks are
parts of sub-atomic parts (10–15). An emergent property is a unique new

